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Abstract
Short answer: It helps a lot when other important variables are excluded from the
information set.
Longer answer: We revisit claims in the literature that money growth is Granger-causal
for inflation at low frequencies. Applying frequency-specific tests in a comprehensive
system setup for euro-area data we consider various theoretical predictors of inflation.
A general-to-specific testing strategy reveals a recursive structure where only the unem-
ployment rate and long-term interest rates are directly Granger-causal for low-frequency
inflation movements, and all variables affect money growth. We therefore interpret op-
posite results from bivariate inflation/money growth systems as spurious due to omitted-
variable biases. We also analyze the resulting four-dimensional system in a cointegration
framework and find structural changes in the long-run adjustment behavior, which do not
affect the main conclusions, however.
Keywords: money growth, Granger causality, quantity theory, unemployment
JEL codes: E31, E40
aThis paper has benefited from comments by Dieter Nautz, Jörg Breitung, Till van Treeck, Christian Proaño-
Acosta, Jürgen Wolters, Helmut Lütkepohl, and by seminar participants at Goethe University Frankfurt, IWH
Halle, Hamburg University, and Free University Berlin. Nonetheless errors are mine.
bMacroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) at Hans Böckler Foundation, and Free University Berlin.




For all economic agents it is important to understand the causes behind inflation movements
at low frequencies, where low-frequency developments may be thought of as the slower but
long-lasting, longer-run changes of a variable. For monetary policy it is important to predict
the long-run inflation developments in order to assess inflationary pressures and to be able
to adjust its policy stance accordingly. Private agents of course also undertake long-term
financial planning and must therefore forecast the more persistent movements of inflation.
An established and popular view of the forces behind inflation movements is based on
the traditional quantity theory of money. According to that view, inflation is predominantly
a monetary phenomenon, and therefore movements of money growth are supposed to cause
inflation changes. A problem with this approach is that already a casual look at the data of
many (developed) countries typically suggests that money growth and inflation indeed share
long-run developments, but can be quite disconnected in the short term, see figure 1 for the
euro-area example. This empirical assessment is also reflected in the practice of modern
macroeconomics to build models without monetary aggregates and many central banks have
abandoned looking closely at the developments of monetary aggregates.
However, other economists such as the intellectual founders of the European Central Bank
(ECB) saved the monetary view by inventing the “two-pillar” approach which reserves a
whole pillar and thus a “prominent role for money” (ECB, 2004) for the longer run, but which
acknowledges that other forces than money growth cause inflation in the short to medium
term. Empirical two-pillar Phillips-curve equations adopt this view by adding money growth
to reduced-form models of inflation (Gerlach, 2004; ECB, 2004; Beck and Wieland, 2007).
For a general discussion on the role of money in monetary policy and for inflation in the
long run see the contributions in a special issue of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking:
Woodford (2008); McCallum (2008); Nelson (2008).
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Figure 1: Money growth and inflation (CPI-based) in the euro area
Additionally, in a series of papers Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2007, 2008a,b,
AW&G) have recently argued that the longer-run (Granger-) causal impact of money growth
on inflation can be empirically established if appropriate econometric techniques are used.
These results attribute to money growth a low-frequency role in the inflation process and
therefore directly support the approach of the ECB.1 Another very recent result about the
predictive content of money growth for (different regimes of) inflation is given in Amisano
and Fagan (2013).
In this paper we take a closer look at the result of low-frequency G-causality running
from money growth to inflation, for the case of the euro area. We use a broader theoreti-
cal foundation for the low-frequency predictors of inflation, including the quantity theory of
money but considering also other possible influences coming from goods, labor, and financial
markets, and from abroad. Mirroring the approach of considering more than one theory, our
1Benati (2009) also confirms a long-run 1:1 relation between money growth and inflation, but seems to rule
out the inverse causation direction a priori.
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empirical strategy is to perform a general-to-specific search routine where empirically non-
causal variables are successively excluded from the analysis. We employ essentially the same
econometric methods as AW&G, especially low-frequency causality tests in a system condi-
tional on other persistent variables. As an empirical concept, the notion of Granger causality
(Granger, 1969, G-causality) rests on predictive power and of course does not necessarily
coincide with any structural notion of causality. Nevertheless, we agree with AW&G that
G-causality represents an immensely useful tool exactly because it shows us how to obtain
better predictions of the variables of interest.
In addition, we provide a detailed specification of vector error-correction models (VECM)
to quantify the long-run relations. Within this parametric framework we also check whether
the error-correction mechanisms (which correspond to the G-causality at the zero frequency)
have changed within the sample.
Based on the richer information set in our analysis we arrive at conclusions that are quite
different from AW&G’s. Money growth turns out as non-causal, while unemployment and
long-term interest rates are the only significant predictors for the low-frequency movements
of inflation. Since we can replicate (qualitatively) AW&G’s results in a bivariate dataset with
money growth and inflation only, this indicates that their findings suffer from an omitted-
variable bias.2
In the following section 2 we discuss the underlying theories. Then in section 3 we briefly
introduce the frequency-domain causality measures and tests, and we report the empirical
details of the search routine and its results. After that we present the VECM analysis in
section 4. Both sections 3 and 4 contain separate subsections showing that the respective
bivariate results from AW&G can be replicated with our dataset. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2See Lütkepohl (1982) for the theory of omitting variables in Granger-causality tests.
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2 Economic theory
In this section we consider several theories that are potentially relevant for low-frequency
movements of inflation, and which will determine our information set for the empirical anal-
ysis. All relationships are presented in a bare-bones form suppressing constants, error terms
and richer dynamics. The empirical methods in this paper account for that.
We start with the quantity theory of money in log-differenced form as in AW&G, where
inflation ∆p is related to money growth ∆m, real output growth ∆y, and changes of velocity
∆v:
∆p= ∆m−∆y+∆v (1)
Of course equation (1) as such is an identity, not a theoretical hypothesis. Apart from
possible additional assumptions about the properties of velocity such as relative stability or
whether it is related to interest rate changes as in AW&G, the key theoretical issue is precisely
given by the hypothesis that money growth tends to determine inflation and not vice versa.3
Since (1) is an identity, we do not need to consider velocity changes once the other three
variables are accounted for.
Next, it is natural to consider the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC, see e.g. Galí
and Gertler, 1999) as a modern theory of inflation, where inflation is driven by discounted





β kEt(marg. costst+k) (2)
The standard approach is to use (log) real unit labor costs ulc− p (essentially the labor share)
3A possible relationship in the levels of prices, money stocks, and real output is analyzed in the money
demand cointegration literature. For euro-area data, Bruggeman et al. (2003) instead use real M3 and inflation
(i.e. they impose price homogeneity in the long run) and find that inflation does not react to money demand
equilibrium deviations, whereas real M3 does. Holtemöller (2004) analyzes nominal M3 and price levels in a
double-integration I(2) framework and finds that both variables are adjusting. More recently Dreger and Wolters
(2010) find a stable money demand relationship, but do not report unconditional adjustment estimates.
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as a proxy for unobservable marginal costs. However, it should be noted that the theory
is originally formulated for business-cycle frequencies and may fail at lower frequencies.
Also, since it is expected future marginal costs that drive current inflation, if the theory and
expectations are (roughly) correct then the predictive Granger causality should run the other
way around, from realized inflation to realized marginal costs, given that we do not observe
expected marginal costs.
Wage-curve models yield additional insights about which factors may affect inflation (see
e.g. Blanchard and Katz, 1997, 1999). From the point of view of wage setters, expected real
hourly wage growth can be written as ∆wt−∆pet (where ∆w is hourly nominal wage growth,
∆pe is expected inflation, and we loosely denote with superscript e a more general concept
of expectations than rational model-consistent expectations) and depends on lagged real unit
labor costs, unemployment4 ut , and the growth of real labor productivity per labor input
(hours) ∆q:
∆wt−∆pet =−(1−α)(ulc− p)t−1−βuut+(1−α)∆qt , α ∈ [0;1], βu > 0,
which can be extended with more complicated dynamics. Using the identities ∆ulct = ∆wt−
∆qt and ∆qt = ∆yt − ∆ht , where h is total labor inputs (log hours), we can rearrange the
equation as follows:
∆ulct = ∆pet − (1−α)(ulc− p)t−1−βuut−α∆yt+α∆ht (3)
In analogy to the discussion of the expectational NKPC, but reversing the argument, here
the empirical G-causality would run in the “right” direction towards observed inflation.
Partially embedded in (3) is another theoretical relationship to justify the inclusion of the
4More generally it is the overall labor market tightness which matters. The unemployment rate serves as a
reasonable proxy here.
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growth rate of (nominal) unit labor costs, namely a simple differenced mark-up pricing rule:
∆p= ∆ulc(e), (4)
where we write “(e)” with parentheses to denote that it may be either realized or expected
developments of unit labor costs which determine inflation, depending on the timing of infor-
mation flows. Again, if the true relationship is expectational, ∆p= ∆ulce, then the empirical
Granger causation would actually run from inflation to unit labor costs. Without differentiat-
ing between frequency bands this direction appears to be the empirical finding at least for US
data (Mehra, 1991; Strauss and Wohar, 2004). Note that a 1:1 relation between ∆p and ∆ulc
in the long-run will hold in all standard models (see e.g. Sbordone, 2002), and that taking (3)
and (4) together would imply feedback G-causation between unit labor costs and inflation,
i.e. something like a wage-price spiral.
Next we consider the Fisher relation, where the long-term (nominal) interest rate i consists
of an equilibrium real rate rr and fluctuations determined by inflation expectations:
i= rr+∆pe (5)
Long-term interest rates i thus should be predictive for realized inflation.
In addition to long-term interest rates there could also be a role for short-term rates by
considering a standard monetary-policy reaction function:
ishort = β∆p(e)+ γ∆y (6)
Here we have formulated the rule in terms of output growth, another standard approach would
be to include some measure of the output gap. Since our information set already includes the
long rates i, we use the spread i− ishort as an equivalent substitute for the short rates in the
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empirical analysis.
Finally, we account for the open-economy dimension by considering the following two
relations: First we employ a differenced form of the real-exchange rate identity:
∆p= ∆p∗+∆Ereal−∆E, (7)
where ∆p∗ is world inflation and ∆E and ∆Ereal are the changes of nominal and real ex-
change rates, respectively. The direction of causality here is mainly an empirical issue. Since
relationship (7) is an identity, the difference ∆Ereal−∆E already captures the informational
content and we drop foreign inflation to avoid perfect collinearity. The second potential chan-
nel affecting inflation in an open economy is given by the hypothesis of Romer (1993) where




For a discussion and evidence of this connection see IMF (2006); Pain et al. (2008).
This concludes our fairly comprehensive tour of potentially relevant economic theories for
the low-frequency movements of inflation. Altogether, the set of variables that are included
in the analysis is therefore given by:
∆p, ∆m, ∆ulc, ulc− p, urate, i, spread, ∆y, open, ∆Ereal−∆E, ∆h
A complication arises with the data on total hours h, which are not usually available for the
euro area as longer time series. Here we resort to the dataset provided by Ohanian and Raffo
(2012): we use the sum of the available series for six euro area countries as a proxy for the
whole euro area. Openness is measured as the ratio of imports and exports over output.
8
3 Frequency-domain analysis5
For long-term interest rates we use 10-year government bond yields, for money we use the M3
aggregate, and inflation is CPI-based. The data are taken from the ECB’s area-wide model
(AWM) dataset which is extended using available equivalent data from the OECD and the
IMF (IFS). We discard the early 1970s to circumvent the problems of dealing with the final
years of the Bretton Woods system and the period before the productivity slowdown. Also
we do not include the recent turmoil of the financial and economic crisis, because we believe
that this episode represents a different regime. Apart from historical interest, the conclusions
from our analysis should be relevant again for the time after the end of the current (at the time
of writing) period of unconventional monetary policies.
The resulting sample is 1974-2008 with roughly 140 quarterly observations. It should be
noted that the sample is dominated by the synthetic AWM data referring to the period prior
to the actual formation of the euro area. While the aggregation to a virtual euro area before
1999 may of course be problematic, there is no obvious way around this issue; furthermore
that dataset is widely used in policy analysis. Figures 1 through 4 plot all included variables,
even starting in 1971.
3.1 Spectra
Before we apply the frequency-wise causality tests we turn to the fundamental properties of







Rxx(τ)exp(− jωτ), −pi ≤ ω ≤ pi (9)
5All empirical results were produced with gretl, see Cottrell and Lucchetti (2009). The frequency-wise G-
causality tests used Breitung’s Gauss code that was ported to the Hansl programming language by the authors.
The code is available as a gretl function package “BreitungCandelonTest” from the official gretl package server.
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Figure 2: Inflation with labor share and unemployment
Figure 3: Inflation with money growth and long-term interest rates
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Figure 6: Inflation with the difference of nominal and real exchange rate changes (FXd-
iff_growth) and growth of total hours
is a Fourier transform of the autocovariances Rxx(τ) (with j as the imaginary unit and τ
indicating the lag) and can be interpreted as measuring the contributions of different cycle
components (at different frequencies ω) for the total variation of the process xt . The typical
spectral shape for many macroeconomic processes is that low frequencies (long-run varia-
tions) dominate the spectrum. In the panels of figure 7 we can confirm this phenomenon for
eight of the eleven considered variables. Only real output growth has an almost flat spectrum,
and so it is clearly stationary, and the spectra of total hours growth and the interest rate spread
only have moderate mass in the low-frequency band.
3.2 Granger causality in the frequency domain – the framework
The well-known notion of causality proposed by Granger (1969) rests on predictive power.
If (and only if) the variable xcause is Granger-causal (G-causal) for the variable xtarget , then
adding xcause to the available information set gives better predictions of xtarget . A generaliza-
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Figure 7: Spectra of the variables. The frequency axis is given in logarithmic scale to empha-
size the low-frequency portion. Variables were normalized to have unit variance.
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different at different cycle frequencies. Using the vector moving average (VMA) representa-
tion zt =Ψ(L)ηt for zt = (xtarget,t ,xcause,t)′ (with L as the lag operator, and ηt is a white noise





Geweke’s causality measure for the frequency ω ∈ (0;pi) is given by:







An obviously interesting hypothesis to test is that of non-causality at a given frequency
ω0, i.e. that M(xcause→ xtarget ; ω0) = 0. Using the fact that M = 0⇔ |Ψ12(e−iω)|= 0, Bre-
itung and Candelon (2006, B&C) showed that this hypothesis is equivalent to two special but
linear restrictions in the underlying VAR, and the test of non-causality therefore has standard
asymptotics. It also allows to account for further conditioning variables which is desirable
given the potential omitted-variable problems mentioned before.
And finally, the B&C test is also applicable to cointegrated systems without having to
impose the cointegration restrictions. In this context, note that the B&C test is not applied
to the infinite-run frequency zero itself; a test for non-causality at frequency zero can be
simply achieved by testing the exclusion of the error-correction terms (zero restrictions on
the adjustment/loading coefficients). We will turn to the analysis of the zero-frequency G-
causality in the VECM framework in section 4.
3.3 Replicating the Assenmacher-Wesche & Gerlach results
When we analyze only a bivariate dataset comprising inflation and money growth we can
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frequency = 2pi / cycle length
H0: M3 growth non-causal
H0: Inflation non-causal
Figure 8: B&C test results, bivariate system of inflation and M3 growth replicating AW&G’s
results. The critical value is represented by the horizontal line.
causal for inflation at low frequencies (left panel) and no G-causality in the other direction.
Therefore our different findings are due to the broader information set that we use, not to
technical differences or to implementation details.
3.4 Test results and directed graphs
We will use the B&C test as a tool to clarify the possibly complex G-causal relationships
between the variables in our dataset. Note that we only report G-causality relationships after
the influence of other variables has been taken into account in the system, to avoid spurious
findings. Because the underlying information set is quite broad, our aim is to reduce the
model to reflect only the truly relevant relationships. Our empirical strategy to achieve this is
as follows:
1. Start with all potentially G-causal variables.
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2. Determine significant low-frequency G-causality relations (and their directions) with
the B&C test.
3. Drop the following variables (except M3 growth and inflation, which are always re-
tained):
(a) Those which are completely non-causal (at low frequencies),
(b) or if there are no non-causal variables, those whose effect on inflation is “most
indirect” in the following intuitive graph-theoretic sense, see for example Eichler
(2007): The system can be represented as a directed graph where each variable
becomes a “node”, and the low-frequency causality connections become “edges”
that connect the nodes. Since we are dealing with directed graphs, the edges will
have one or two arrowheads indicating the causality directions. A causal effect
from variable A to B is direct if the two nodes are connected by an edge, with
the appropriate arrowhead. An indirect causal effect is given when there is no
edge between nodes A and B, but there are appropriate directed edges running for
example from node A to node C, and from node C to node B. A causal variable
X has the “most indirect” effect on Z if the shortest possible directed path from
node X to node Z is longer than from any other causal variable to the target Z.
(c) If there are more than one most indirect causal variables with respect to inflation,
drop the one which is least connected to money growth.
4. Go back to step 2 until no further variables can be dropped.
“Non-causal” variables are those which do not G-cause any other variable in a frequency
band ranging from zero to roughly 0.25 (where the cycle periodicity is roughly 25 quarters,
or about six years). For all underlying VAR systems a uniform lag length of three was chosen,
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Figure 9: Detailed B&C test results, full variable set, target variable is the inflation rate. The
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Figure 10: Detailed B&C test results, full variable set, target variable is money growth. The
critical value is represented by the horizontal line.
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Figure 11: Low-frequency G-causality graph, full variable set. Drawn edges with arrows
indicate significant low-frequency Granger causality (G-causality).
In figures 9 and 10 we report the detailed test results for all frequencies with inflation and
money growth as target variables, respectively. (In the rest of the paper we will not report
these detailed test results again, but instead we will consolidate the results into figures of di-
rected graphs.) At low frequencies, the only significantly G-causal variable is unemployment
for both target variables, but due to the large dimension of the system it remains to be seen
whether this may be due to a loss of power of the tests.
The “directed graph” summarizing the information contained in all the similar (non-
reported) test plots is shown in figure 11. Such a graph may in principle contain some direct
feedback G-causality or indirect circular G-causality paths. In this case it turns out that total
hours growth (∆h) is the only completely non-causal variable (at low frequencies). Accord-
ing to our empirical reduction strategy described above, we will therefore drop total hours
growth from the dataset.
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Figure 12: Low-frequency G-causality graph, 2nd iteration
In the second iteration the G-causality graph in figure 12 does not contain any completely
non-causal variables anymore. Note also that more variables than before now appear as G-
causal for inflation and money growth: the long-term bond yield affects both, and furthermore
inflation also appears as a low-frequency predictor for money growth (but not vice versa).
The “most indirect” causal effects come from the spread and from openness, but since the
openness variable is a node on a causal path from money to inflation and we do not wish to
bias our results against money growth as a predictor, we drop the spread.
After having dropped the spread, in the 3rd iteration (figure 13) among the secondary
variables the difference of exchange rate changes (FXdiff_gr) is one of the most indirect
effects and is least connected to money growth, and thus we drop it next.
The picture in the next (4th) iteration is still quite complex, although now the only directly
significant effect on inflation stems from the unemployment rate. The candidate variables for
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Figure 13: Low-frequency G-causality graph, 3rd iteration
dropping are the labor share and openness; since the only G-causal effect from money growth
works through the labor share, according to our rule we decide to keep that and drop openness
instead.
In order to save space, we report the next iterations only textually, without further fig-
ures: In the seven-dimensional system of the next step the unit-labor cost growth (ULC_gr)
becomes non-causal –along with money growth– and is dropped; afterwards the labor share
becomes also non-causal (along with real output growth) and is dropped. Next, in the sys-
tem with only inflation, money growth, unemployment, the long-term yield, and real out-
put growth remaining, the latter variable only G-causes unemployment at low frequencies,
whereas unemployment and the yield directly affect inflation. Thus we finally arrive at a
four-dimensional system where from the initial broad information set only unemployment
and the yield are kept, apart from the central variables inflation and money growth. The
resulting directed graph is shown in figure 15.
Somewhat surprisingly, the resulting low-frequency G-causality graph has a recursive
structure without any feedback effects. At the end of the G-causality chain stands money
growth, which is significantly affected by all three remaining variables, but which itself is not
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Figure 14: Low-frequency G-causality graph, 4th iteration
Figure 15: Low-frequency G-causality graph, final
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a low-frequency predictor.
4 Error-correction model estimates
The previous section presented test results concerning the existence of low-frequency G-
causality relationships, but remained silent on the quantitative dimension. In this section
we provide quantitative models of the long-run determinants of inflation. We employ the
standard tool of a vector error-correction model (VECM, i.e. a suitable representation of a
cointegrated VAR with K lags):








Here we have already imposed the deterministic specification of a constant term restricted
to the cointegration space, and β ∗ = (β ′, β ′c)′ is the (n+1)× r matrix holding the cointegra-
tion coefficients β as well as the coefficients of the restricted constant βc, where n is the
dimension of the system and r is the cointegration rank. If 0 < r < n, the system is truly
cointegrated, and α and β will have reduced rank.
Strictly speaking this choice means that we are not analyzing the open frequency band
from 0 to 0.25 anymore but that we are analyzing the zero frequency itself. Now, when
we model a cointegrated system, we are indeed assuming that the included variables are
I(1), i.e. have a spectral peak (singularity) at the zero frequency.6 In that sense the different
methods are theoretically complementary; in practice, however, we expect similar features of
the data because in finite samples the difference between low but positive frequencies and the
zero frequency are usually blurred.
6We can back up this claim by formal unit root tests, but reporting the results yields no value added over
what is known in the literature.
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Table 1: Bivariate cointegration analysis
rank eigenvalue trace stat. λ -max stat.
0 0.10 18.54 [0.084] 14.57 [0.079]
1 0.03 3.98 [0.427] 3.98 [0.426]
Notes: Johansen cointegration rank test; p-values in brackets; lag order = 5; sample 1974:1 - 2008:3
(T=137), restricted constant.
Inflation M3 growth constant
error-correction term 1 -1 3.98 (0.512)
loadings -0.259 (0.069) 0 -
Notes: VECM estimates; standard errors in parentheses; LR test of the two restrictions χ2(2) = 0.109
(p = 0.947).
4.1 The bivariate system of money growth and inflation
In section 3.3 we showed that in a bivariate setup the results of AW&G reappear, namely
that money growth seems to be long-run G-causal for inflation. Now we investigate the
characteristics of the corresponding bivariate VECM.
The Johansen cointegration test indeed finds cointegration between inflation and money
growth, although it does so only at the 10% significance level, see the upper panel of table
1. Furthermore, the lower panel reports that it is statistically acceptable to restrict the corre-
sponding cointegration vector to a 1:1 relationship. The super-consistent coefficients of this
irreducible cointegration vector enjoy the property that they are asymptotically invariant to
extensions of the information set.
Mirroring the results of the bivariate B&C tests in section 3.3, the adjustment coefficients
(loadings) also appear to support the hypothesis that inflation adjusts to long-run deviations
while money growth is not caused by it. But note that the loading coefficients may be mis-
leading if the system is mis-specified, because they are attached to stationary terms and thus
the standard omitted-variables bias applies.
23
4.2 The system with the low-frequency predictors of inflation
We build on the system reduction analysis in the previous section and consider the four-
dimensional, potentially cointegrated, VAR with inflation, money growth, unemployment,
and the long-term bond yield. The full sample is still specified as 1974:1-2008:2.
First we run the standard Johansen cointegration test procedure to determine the cointe-
gration rank of the system; in order to avoid the known finite-sample size distortions of this
test we apply the Bartlett correction of Johansen (2002).7 The results are shown in table 2
(upper panel), clearly indicating two linearly independent cointegration relationships in this
system at the 1% level of significance. In this case it is even irrelevant whether the Bartlett
correction is applied or not.8
The estimates of the long-run structure of the system is shown in the lower panel of table
2, where we have applied a number of statistically and economically acceptable coefficient
restrictions. First of all, the first cointegration vector is again restricted to be a 1:1 relationship
between inflation and money growth:
∆m= 3.71+∆p
If interpreted from the perspective of the quantity equation, the constant term in this relation-
ship captures the (differences of the) averages of real output growth and velocity changes.
The second cointegration vector is identified by setting the coefficient of money growth to
zero, whereas the remaining coefficients for unemployment and the yield are freely estimated
7An implementation of this test procedure has recently been made available as a gretl function package on
the standard gretl package server (“coint2finite”).
8We have also checked a specification including centered seasonal dummies, because even though the series
are supposed to be seasonally adjusted there might have been some remaining seasonality. There were no
qualitative differences.
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(apart from the normalization of the inflation coefficient):
∆p=−8.45+0.43 i−0.90urate
These estimated coefficients have plausible signs: higher unemployment tends to lead to
lower inflation, and a higher nominal yield tends to be reflected in higher inflation, ceteris
paribus. The latter result is in line with the Fisher effect motivation, but of course a strict
bivariate Fisher interpretation is difficult to reconcile with this trivariate longer-run relation,
apart from the fact that the interest rate coefficient is quite far from unity.
With respect to the equilibrium-correcting behavior of the system, the most important
feature is that the unemployment rate and the yield are not adjusting at all. This means that
these two variables are weakly exogenous, i.e. not being G-caused in the long run by the other
variables, and they drive the system in the long-run by feeding the two stochastic trends into
it. Therefore we have a clearcut separation in this four-dimensional system between two long-
run driving variables (unemployment and the yield) and two adjusting variables (inflation and
money growth). The remaining issue is the detailed adjustment behavior of inflation. Here we
see that inflation is not reacting to the equilibrium deviations in the inflation-money growth
relationship, which is in quite stark contrast to the results of the bivariate system in section
4.1. Thus the adjustment burden with respect to this first cointegration vector is exclusively
borne by money growth. Inflation in turn is the variable which corrects the deviations from
the second long-run equilibrium relationship, and quite strongly so. Money growth also reacts
to these second equilibrium deviations, even though it is not part of that relationship.
4.3 Changes in the long-run G-causality structure
In figure 16 we display the results of the Hansen and Johansen (1999) test for stability of the
cointegration coefficients; for this test the unrestricted cointegration space estimates are used,
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Table 2: Cointegration analysis and VECM estimation results
rank H0 trace stat. asympt. p-val Bartlett p-val Bartlett trace stat.
0 98.8 0.000 0.000 87.9
1 47.8 0.001 0.005 43.3
2 15.3 0.213 0.309 13.8
3 4.39 0.369 0.517 3.41
Notes: Cointegration rank test, asymptotically and with small-sample Bartlett correction according
to Johansen (2002); restricted constant, lag order = 3, sample: 1974:1 - 2008:2 (T = 138).
Inflation M3_growth Unemployment Yield_10yr cnst
coint. relation 1 1 -1 0 0 3.71 (0.350)
adjustment coeff. 0 0.37 (0.059) 0 0 -
coint. relation 2 1 0 0.90 (0.038) -0.43 (0.033) -8.45 (0.451)
adjustment coeff. -0.83 (0.135) -0.64 (0.118) 0 0 -
Notes: Restricted VECM estimates, coefficients 1, 0, -1 are restricted and/or normalized; restriction
test: χ2(7) = 10.10 (p = 0.183); VECM contains restricted constant, levels lag order 3, standard
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Figure 16: Stability test of the cointegration coefficients (four-dimensional system as in table
2, but based on unrestricted estimates)
not the restricted ones reported in table 2. There are nominal rejections of stability around
2004 at the 5% level of significance. However, the maximum test statistics just barely exceed
the critical value, and thus we do not interpret this test result as strong evidence against the
stability of the long-run relationships.
On the other hand, we suspect that there may have been structural breaks in the dy-
namic adjustment behavior of the system, for example perhaps due to German unification
in 1990/91. Such a break could have had direct implications for the long-run G-causality
patterns between the variables. Therefore in the following we analyze a generalized model
where the adjustment matrix α is allowed to change.
We model and test for a structural break as follows: The timing of the potential break
is fixed exogenously at the middle of the sample, i.e. in the year 1991, which in this sam-
ple also roughly coincides with German unification.9 We also take as given the full-sample
estimates of the cointegration relationships because of the weak evidence against stability
as discussed before, and also because the subsamples would be too short to estimate sepa-
9Of course, this date also coincides roughly with the end of the disinflation process in the euro area. We
do not choose the potential break period based on the inflation data, however, because that would give rise to
pretesting issues.
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rate long-run relationships reliably. We thus take the two-dimensional error-correction terms
ectt = βˆ ∗
′
(x′t , 1)′ as given. Let s1991q1,t be a step dummy taking the value 1 in and after 1991,
and zero elsewhere. Then we estimate the following system:





In this extended VECM the parameter α1 contains the adjustment coefficients for the first
half of the sample, while the loadings for the second half are given as α1 +α2. Without a
structural break, the corresponding element of α2 would not be significantly different from
zero. In a first step, the system 13 can be estimated efficiently with OLS. After restricting
some elements of α1 or α2 to zero, we estimate the system efficiently by feasible GLS (SUR).
The upper panel of table 3 contains the full estimates of model 13. In this unrestricted
specification no break terms (α2) are significant, and the only qualitative difference with
respect to the earlier full-sample analysis is that unemployment now also seems to adjust
significantly to equilibrium deviations. (A finding which would not change the conclusions
with respect to the G-causality relationships between inflation and money growth.)
Then we proceed to apply various restrictions: the yield is still weakly exogenous, i.e.
α1;4,1 = α1;4,2 = α2;4,1 = α2;4,2 = 0, which is clearly still acceptable (χ24 = 3.47, p = 0.48);
in addition, the adjustment of money growth does not change, α2;2,1 = α2;2,2 = 0, which
jointly gives F6,496 = 0.80, p = 0.57; next, the adjustment of inflation to the first cointegra-
tion vector –the inflation-money growth relation– does not break, α2;1,1 = 0, F7,496 = 0.69,
p = 0.68; furthermore, the adjustment of unemployment breaks in such a way that unem-
ployment becomes weakly exogenous (not long-run G-caused) in the second subsample,
α1;3,1+α2;3,1 = 0, α1;3,2+α2;3,2 = 0, F9,496 = 0.561, p= 0.829, and finally, inflation does not
adjust at all to the first long-run equilibrium, α1;1,1 = 0, yielding F10,496 = 0.625, p= 0.793.
The final result of the long-run structure is reported in the lower panel of table 3.
28
The most important features of this final specification are the following:
• The adjustment behavior of money growth is essentially unchanged and not subject to
the structural break.
• In the recent (post-1991) subsample unemployment and the long-term yield are weakly
exogenous and drive the system at the zero frequency, coinciding with the full-sample
results. In the earlier subsample, however, the unemployment rate was also equilibrium-
correcting.
• For the adjustment of inflation we confirm the previous result that it does not react to
deviations from the inflation-money growth relationship. The reaction of inflation to
the second long-run relationship, however, becomes quite a bit stronger in the second
subsample, rising (in absolute terms) from 0.64 to 1.04. It appears that some of the
equilibrium adjustment has shifted from unemployment to inflation.
• With respect to the long-run G-causality of money growth, the second subsample ap-
pears qualitatively as the full-sample estimates, with money growth being purely long-
run non-causal. In the first subsample, an isolated rise (fall) of money growth would
produce a fall (rise) of unemployment through the partial reaction to the negative (pos-
itive) deviation from the inflation-money equilibrium; this fall (rise) of unemployment
would imply a positive (negative) deviation from the equilibrium relationship linking
inflation, unemployment, and the yield, to which inflation would in turn react by falling
(rising). However, this channel from money to inflation only runs indirectly through
unemployment again, and secondly, the sign of this partial effect is inconsistent with
the long-run 1:1 relationship between the two variables. Therefore the full system dy-
namics would still have to be taken into account for long-run inflation predictions even
in the first subsample.
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Table 3: Estimates with breaks in the long-run adjustments
Unrestricted
estimates
Inflation equ. M3_growth equ. Unempl. equ. Yield equ.
α1
adj. to ECT1 0.14 (0.168) 0.40** (0.087) 0.038* (0.015) 0.017 (0.036)
adj. to ECT2 -0.83** (0.308) -0.66** (0.159) -0.061* (0.029) 0.0072 (0.067)
α2
adj. to ECT1 -0.055 (0.197) -0.067 (0.102) -0.031 (0.018) -0.039 (0.043)
adj. to ECT2 -0.40 (0.310) 0.025 (0.160) 0.051 (0.029 -0.0099 (0.067)
Restricted
estimates
Inflation equ. M3_growth equ. Unempl. equ. Yield equ.
α1
adj. to ECT1 0 0.37** (0.0574) 0.036* (0.0140) 0
adj. to ECT2 -0.64** (0.143) -0.64** (0.115) -0.057* (0.0239) 0
α2
adj. to ECT1 0 0 -0.036* (na) 0
adj. to ECT2 -0.40* (0.158) 0 0.057* (na) 0
Restriction test: F10,496 = 0.625, p= 0.793.
Notes: ECT1 and ECT2 are the (deviations from the) cointegration relationships from ta-
ble 2; notably ECT1 = ∆p−∆m+ const. The adjustment matrix for the subsample
1974:3-1990:4 is α1, for the subsample 1991:1-2008:2 it is α1+α2. Standard errors in
parentheses (not separately available in the unemployment equation for α2 because the
coefficients are restricted to be equal to the negative of the ones of α1).
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Also note that the negative reaction of money growth to the second cointegration relation-
ship involving unemployment and long-term interest rates may lead to short-run “perverse”
dynamics of money growth. For example, after a positive shock to inflation, money growth
would at first shrink and thereby the difference ∆p−∆m would be amplified. Afterwards
however, the combined reactions of inflation and money growth would restore the two long-
run equilibria.
5 Conclusions
The main result of this paper is that we find evidence for unemployment and long-term inter-
est rates as predictors –and thus Granger-causal variables– of low-frequency movements of
inflation in the euro area. None of the other investigated variables turned out to be relevant
long-run drivers once unemployment and long-term interest rates were taken into account,
including money growth.10 We therefore conclude that some recent studies in the literature
that attribute an empirically important role to money growth for inflation at low frequencies
may suffer from omitted-variable bias. Our findings therefore do not support a prominent
role for monetary stance analysis even for the longer run. Instead, for longer-term inflation
assessments the ECB as well as the general public would have to focus on the unemployment
rate and long-term interest rates.11
It is intuitively plausible that unemployment as the main indicator of labor market tight-
10The list of variables included growth of unit labor costs, hours worked, real output, and of the gap between
nominal and real exchange rates; and the spread, a trade openness indicator, and the labor share. In a reduced
bivariate dataset we could also replicate the result by Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2007, 2008a) that the
Granger causality at low frequencies appears to run from money to inflation.
11With respect to interest rates one might argue that they are themselves determined by the central bank.
However, the central bank only controls the short-term policy rates and the link from short-term to long-term
rates (i.e., the yield curve) is not constant. In our analysis the term spread also turned out as irrelevant for low-
frequency inflation predictions, given the other variables. In any case, only the policy makers themselves know
for sure to what extent changes in their policy rate are reactions to changed long-run inflation expectations.
They are free to discard the information contained in long-term rates. But for private agents the signals emitted
by movements of long-term interest rates are clearly valuable to assess the long-run inflation outlook.
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ness signals future inflation changes (for example, rising unemployment tends to dampen
inflation in the long run). Equally plausible is the positive low-frequency effect of long-term
interest rates on inflation, because they likely signal movements of long-run inflation expec-
tations which later materialize in observed inflation rates. In addition, we can confirm that a
bivariate equi-proportional (1:1) long-run relation between money (M3) growth and inflation
in the euro area is compatible with the data.
Checking for structural shifts in these patterns, we only found that unemployment used
to be (and afterwards ceased to be) long-run Granger-caused in the first part of the sample,
and that in the second part of the sample inflation reacts more strongly to disequilibria with
respect to long-term interest rates and unemployment. The main finding that money growth
is largely irrelevant as a predictor for long-run inflation movements remained intact.
Our results do not mean that monetary aggregates would be non-causal for inflation under
all circumstances. In a hypothetical scenario of large and exogenous “helicopter drops” of
money it would of course be expected that inflation reacts. Also, we do not claim that our
analysis is applicable to the special situation of the great recession since 2009, with a binding
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, which
we believe to represent a different regime. But after the return to standard monetary policy
operations our findings would again be directly relevant.
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